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Today there are nearly fifty sovereignty-based conflicts throughout the world.
Nearly all of these conflicts entail a high degree of violence with state security
forces engaged in active combat or aggressive policing operations against armed
rebel forces.' In many instances the rebel forces have resorted to terrorism. In
fact, at least a third of the Specially Designated Global Terrorists listed by the
United States Treasury Department are associated with sovereignty-based
conflicts. 2 In addition, a number of non-violent sovereignty-based conflicts
undermine regional stability and prospects for political and economic
development.
Until recently, most efforts to resolve sovereignty-based conflicts have
faltered due to the limited legal and political tools available to policy makers. The
two most applicable principles, sovereignty and self-determination have been
reduced to little more than legal and political shields behind which states and substate entities justify their actions.
While these two basic principles of international law may sometimes be
reconciled to create a lasting settlement of a sovereignty-based conflict, more
frequently they are a recipe for political gridlock and violence.
Given that the international community of nations is structured around the
principle of sovereignty, any effort to dilute the principle or to expand the notion
of self-determination to more readily facilitate the secessionist ambitions of
numerous minority or ethnic groups will have serious consequences. The fear that
too loose a re-definition of sovereignty might lead to a spiraling of selfdetermination claims and calls for independence is genuine. So to is the fear that
the global community will become populated with unstable mini-states which
1. Countries involved in violent sovereignty-based conflicts include for example India, Pakistan,
Sri Lanka, Russia, Spain, Macedonia, Sudan, the United Kingdom, Israel, Indonesia, Papua New
Guinea, France, Turkey, Mexico, Morocco, the Philippines, and China.
2. See U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control,
Cumulative List ofRecent OFAC Actions 2002, availableat
http ://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/actions/2002cum. html (last visited Oct. 16, 2002).
3. Countries involved in non-violent, but nevertheless destabilizing sovereignty-based conflicts
include Montenegro, Canada, Bosnia, and Cameroon.
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breed yet more conflict ridden mini-states.
Different, yet equally destabilizing consequences arise from the hierarchical
relationship between sovereignty and self-determination. Given that under the
prevailing conceptualization of sovereignty a state is generally entitled to near
absolute discretion to deal with self-determination movements, many states freely
opt for the aggressive use of force. The over-reliance on the use of force is
inherently destabilizing and tends to radicalize self-determination movements,
which then often turn to terrorism. Even in instances where states embark upon
campaigns of attempted genocide, as in the case of the Serbian campaign against
Kosovo Albanians, the principle of sovereignty prohibits international intervention,
leading to surreal situations such as where the NATO humanitarian intervention
designed to stop the atrocities was dubbed "illegal" but "legitimate."
All too frequently the mantra of sovereignty is used by states to shield
themselves from international action to prevent them from violating human rights
and committing atrocities in their attempts to stifle self-determination movements,
as in the case of the Iraqi Anfal campaigns against the Kurds, the Turkish
suppression of Kurdish human rights, the Russian campaign in Chechnya, the
targeting of Christians in Southern Sudan, and Indonesia's brutal occupation of
East Timor and its recent campaign in Aceh.
Recent state practice, however, has evidenced a growing creativity among
states and policy makers which has led to the emergence of a more elastic
approach to resolving sovereignty-based conflicts. The new approach, the seeds of
which can be found in a number of recent peace proposals and peace agreements,
can be termed "earned sovereignty." 4
As developed in recent state practice, the approach of earned sovereignty is
designed to create an opportunity for resolving sovereignty-based conflicts by
providing for the managed devolution of sovereign authority and functions from a
state to a sub-state entity. The authority and functions may include the power to
collect taxes, control the development of natural resources, conduct local policing
operations, maintain a local army or defense force, enter into international treaties
on certain matters, maintain representative offices abroad, and participate in some
form in international bodies. In some instances the sub-state entity may acquire
sufficient sovereign authority and functions which will then' enable it to seek
international recognition, while in others the sub-state entity may only acquire
sufficient authority and functions to enable it to operate within a stable system of
internal autonomy.
The instances of recent state practice evidencing the development of this new
approach include the following:
The Israeli/Palestinian conflict: where the Road Map for Peace provides for
the continued devolution of specific sovereign authorities and functions to the

4. As an emerging concept, the approach of earned sovereignty has been referred to by many
names, including intermediate sovereignty, provisional statehood, conditional recognition, and earned
recognition.
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Palestinian Authority, such as the right to maintain independent security forces and
to operate an international airport so long as it meets certain conditions, such as
preventing terrorist attacks against Israel, removing Chairman Arafat from
effective control over the Palestinian Authority, and implementing the rule of law.
The Road Map then envisions eventual statehood for Palestine if it fulfills the
conditions and if it demonstrates itself capable of effectively exercising its
acquired sovereign authority and functions.
The Northern Ireland conflict: where the Good Friday Accord provides for the
creation of Northern Ireland institutions, and the devolution of substantial power to
those institutions so long as the IRA fulfills its obligation to decommission
weapons. The Accords also provide that the people of Northern Ireland are
entitled to a referendum on unification with Ireland within seven years.
The Sudan conflict: where the Machakos Protocol provides for the substantial
devolution of central government authorities, and the opportunity for Southern
Sudan to hold a referendum within six years on the question of secession from
Sudan.
The Western Sahara conflict: where the UN sponsored Baker Peace Plan
provides for the UN assisted creation of a Western Sahara government and the
devolution of numerous sovereign authorities and functions to that government.
The Plan then provides for a referendum on self-determination to determine the
final status of Western Sahara within five years.
The Kosovo conflict: where UN Security Council Resolution 1244 provides
for the near total displacement of Yugoslav sovereignty from Kosovo and its
replacement with interim UN and NATO sovereign responsibilities, the creation of
local institutions of self-government, the creation of a process for determining
Kosovo's final status, and the eventual transfer of authority from the UN
administering institutions to the institutions to be established under a political
settlement.
The Bosnia conflict: where the Dayton Accords provided that many of the
sovereign authorities and functions of the independent state of Bosnia would be
managed by an internationally appointed High Representative for an indeterminate
period. The Accords also provided for the deployment of international military
forces to maintain internal security. While conditionality is not explicit, the pattern
of practice in Bosnia indicates that the international civilian authority will be
discontinued only upon such a time as Bosnia can adequately function as an
independent state.
The East Timor conflict: where after a referendum rejecting continued
association with Indonesia, the United Nations managed a two and a half year
transition process during which time East Timor was able to construct the
institutions necessary for independent self-government.
The Serbia/Montenegro dispute: where the new constitution transforming the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia into the Union of Serbia and Montenegro provides
for the devolution of nearly all the sovereign authority and functions to the two
member states. The remaining authority and functions are jointly managed by
representatives of the member states. At the end of a three year period, the
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member states are entitled to hold a referendum on independence.
The growing willingness of states and sub-state entities to consider a process
of earned sovereignty for resolving self-determination disputes is matched by the
increasing ability of the international community to aid states in institution
building and to help manage the transfer of sovereign powers and authority. The
OSCE for instance now possesses significant experience in monitoring and
conducting elections, while the European Union is experienced with the creation of
new state institutions, and the United Nations with the creation of mechanisms to
ensure the protection of human and minority rights, and implementation of the rule
of law.
In light of recent state practice, the emerging conflict resolution approach of
earned sovereignty may be characterized as encompassing six elements - three
core elements and three optional elements.
The first core element is shared sovereignty. In each case of earned
sovereignty the state and sub-state entity may both exercise sovereign authority
and functions over a defined territory. In some instances, international institutions
may also exercise sovereign authority and functions in addition to or in lieu of the
parent state. In rare cases, the international community may exercise shared
sovereignty with an internationally recognized state. In almost all instances an
international institution is responsible for monitoring the parties exercise of their
authority and functions.
The second core element is institution building. This element is utilized
during the period of shared sovereignty prior to the determination of final status.
Here the sub-state entity, frequently with the assistance of the international
community, undertakes to construct institutions for self-government and to build
institutions capable of exercising increasing sovereign authority and functions.
The third core element is the eventual determination of the final status of the
sub-state entity and its relationship to the state. In many instances the status will
be determined by a referendum, while in others it may involve a negotiated
settlement between the state and sub-state entity, often with international
mediation. Invariably the determination of final status for the sub-state entity
involves the consent of the international community in the form of international
recognition.
The first optional element is phased sovereignty. Phased sovereignty entails
the accumulation by the sub-state entity of increasing sovereign authority and
functions over a specified period of time prior to the determination of final status.
The second optional element is conditional sovereignty. Conditionality may
be applied to the accumulation of increasing sovereign authority and functions by
the sub-state entity, or it may be applied to the determination of the sub-state
entity's final status. In either case the sub-state entity is required to meet certain
benchmarks before it may acquire increased. These benchmarks may include
conditions such as protecting human and minority rights, developing democratic
institutions, instituting the rule of law, and promoting regional stability. While the
relationship between the attainment of certain benchmarks and the devolution of
authority, or recognition as an independent state may be formally expressed, there
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may often be an informal relationship.
The third optional element, constrained sovereignty, involves continued
limitations on the sovereign authority and functions of the new state, such as
continued international administrative and/or military presence, and limits on the
right of the state to undertake territorial association with other states.
In almost all instances the state and sub-state entities adopt the elements of
earned sovereignty by mutual agreement, but in some instances the international
community may support or initiate one or more of the elements of earned
sovereignty against the interests of the state or sub-state entity.
To better understand the potential utility of the emerging conflict resolution
approach of earned sovereignty, the Public International Law & Policy Group has
undertaken a Carnegie Corporation of New York supported project to map the
development of the approach and to identify ways in which the approach may be
better used to promote the resolution of sovereignty-based conflicts. The three
articles which follow this introductory note are part of the initial phase of the
project and are produced in cooperation with the Denver University Law School.
The ideas expressed in the articles were refined during a day long roundtable held
at the University.
The purpose of the first article is to provide a detailed definition of earned
sovereignty, and its sub-components, as well as to track the development of the
doctrine through recent state practice. The second article sets forth the legal basis
for the doctrine, and the third article tracks international efforts to employ the
doctrine as a basis for structuring a long term resolution of the Kosovo conflict.
In addition to initiating a scholarly debate as to the development and utility of
the approach of earned sovereignty, the Public International Law & Policy Group
is also sponsoring a series of roundtable discussions with former peace negotiators
in order to better understand the political bargaining process which results in the
use of an earned sovereignty approach, and will be running a series of diplomacy
gaming scenarios to test the applicability of the concept to as yet unresolved
sovereignty-based conflicts.
It is important to conclude with a reminder the purpose of the project is not to
argue that the approach of earned sovereignty has evolved into a customary
international legal principle, or that it is a one-size fits all solution to sovereigntybased conflicts. The focus of the following articles, and the project as a whole is to
help state and sub-state entities involved in sovereignty-based conflicts, as well as
future peace negotiators to identify an emerging approach which may be well
suited to assist them in the resolution of their particular conflict.

